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Abstract 
 
The Blount Report of 1893 is a comprehensive exposé of the American-led 
overthrow of Hawai’i’s Queen Lili’uokalani and subsequent seizure of the Hawaiian 
government.  Ordered by President Grover Cleveland and composed by Georgia 
Congressman James Blount, the Blount Report includes numerous first-hand observations 
of the overthrow unparalleled in credibility and specificity, which shed light on the the 
influence of sugar fortune, the political power of missionaries and their descendants, and 
the role of American imperial interests. Ultimately, the Blount Report implicates the United 
States, exposing the active support of the U.S. Minister to Hawai’i and U.S. Marines in the 
1893 coup d’état. By extension, the U.S. government is also incriminated by knowingly 
legitimating this unjust seizure of power, through annexation of Hawai’i as a territory and 
eventually as a State.  
This paper uses the Blount Report to reveal the nature of the evolving American 
colonizer in Hawai’i—from religious missionary to prosperous oligarch.  The events 
occurring in Hawai’i between 1820, when missionaries arrived, and 1893, when Queen 
Lili’uokalani was overthrown, mark the transformation from a colonial project based on 
civilization and christianzation to the materialization of a settler colonial structure, with the 
ultimate goal of annexing to the United States.  Settler colonization, unlike classic 
colonization, seeks permanency and invisibility, whereby the settler fully defines and 
assumes the identity of the colony.  For Hawai’i, Queen Lili’uokalani’s overthrow formed 
the foundation for the ongoing settler structure upon which the American State of Hawai’i 
is built. By using the Blount Report to illuminate the underlying structure of Hawai’i’s 
settler colonial state, this paper intends to contribute to the project of Hawai’i’s anti-
colonial settler deconstruction.  
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I. Introduction 
In January of 1893, a group of wealthy white businessmen launched a coup d’état 
against Hawai’i’s sovereign ruler Queen Lili’uokalani.  Backed by the U.S. Minister and U.S. 
Marines, they proclaimed themselves to rule as the Provisional Government until such time 
as Hawai’i should be annexed to the United States.  More wealth was the inspiration—a 
recent tariff had limited the abundance of riches accessible to the sugar plantationers, and 
they had exhausted opportunities to consolidate power to themselves within the Kingdom 
of Hawai’i.  Addressing Congress on the matter, President Grover Cleveland condemned 
the overthrow as an “act of war” and the Provisional Government as an “oligarchy, set up 
without the assent of the people.”1  Despite this critique, Hawai’i remains occupied by the 
United States over a century later. The islands function as America’s premier Pacific 
military outpost and vacation destination, while Native Hawaiians struggle to find 
affordable housing and face the ongoing depletion of Hawai’i’s natural resources.   
The United States now comfortably calls Hawai’i its own, with the overthrow and 
pre-existing Kingdom all but written out of history.  Exercising its “sovereign prerogative,” 
the United States has continually imposed its law, language, military, economic, and 
political structures on Hawai’i, and in exchange, takes for itself the land and resources of 
Hawai’i.2  The uninterrupted control that the United States exercises over Hawai’i and its 
																																																						
1 U.S. Congress, President’s Message Relating to the Hawaiian Islands, 53rd Cong., 2d sess, 1893, 443-
1150, 456. (Cleveland’s Message to Congress).  
2 Natsu Taylor Saito, “Tales of Color and Colonialism: Racial Realism and Settler Colonial Theory,” 
Florida A&M Univ. Law Review, 10, no. 11 (2014): 26-27; Haunani-Kay Trask, From a Native 
Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai’i (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 103. Trask 
states, “The relationship between [indigenous peoples] and those who want control of us and our 
resources is not a formerly colonial relationship but an ongoing colonial relationship.”; Haunani-Kay 
Trask, “The Color of Violence,” Social Justice, 31, no. 4 (2004): 10. “Our people are in prison, are 
homeless, and undereducated. Is this a violent situation? Of course. Is this a result of American 
colonization? Of course. … There must be a dominant language, a dominant legal system, a 
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indigenous residents exemplifies the observation that settler colonization is a “structure, 
not an event.”3  In the settler colonial structure of Hawai’i, the overthrow of Queen 
Lili’uokalani is the foundation.  
To explicate the foundations of Hawai’i’s settler colonial structure, this paper 
critically examines the Blount Report of 1893.4  This Report, ordered by President Grover 
Cleveland, is a comprehensive exposé of the overthrow of Queen Lili’uokalani, recorded 
by a U.S. Senator from Georgia.  Using the Blount Report, this paper has one primary goal: 
to reveal the series of colonial events taken strategically by wealthy Americans to seize 
power from the Hawaiian monarchy, and the relation that those events have to Hawai’i’s 
ongoing settler colonial structure.  The existence of the Blount Report in federal and public 
records well before decision-makers moved to annex the Kingdom proves the intent to 
commit a wrong and belies any claim that the United States acted with clean hands, rather 
than pure imperial ambition.  Moreover, this exploration of the Blount Report 
demonstrates how the United States played an indispensable role in legitimating the unjust 
seizure of power during and after the coup.  
Finally, this examination of the Blount Report elucidates the distinctions between 
colonizing events and the eventual settler colonial structure as they are reflected in the 
evolving goals of Americans in Hawai’i.  While the two processes of colonization and 
settler colonization often intertwine (and do, in the case of Hawai’i), the two are 
																																																						
dominant educational system, and so on and so on. In other words, there must be dominance and 
subordination.”  
3 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research, 
8, no. 4 (2006): 388.  
4 53rd Cong., 2d sess, 1893, 443-1150. This congressional document includes Cleveland’s Message 
to Congress; Correspondences (primarily between Secretary of State Gresham and James Blount) 
(Part I); Affidavits submitted to James Blount in Hawai’i (Part II); Interviews and Statements Given 
to Blount (Part III); and “Miscellaneous” submissions (Part IV).  Blount’s Report documenting his 
conclusions for President Cleveland is found in Part I: No. 17, at pages 567-606. 
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fundamentally different, and should be examined independently.5  Whereas the goal of 
colonialism is to reinforce a relationship between the colonizer and colonized based on 
difference, the goal of settler colonialism is to erase the distinction between between Native 
and settler.6  Settler colonialism strives negatively to dissolve Native societies, and 
positively to replace the indigenous society with a new colonial society on the same land 
base.7  These different colonial structures prompt different decolonizing responses.8  
Because settler colonialism pursues an endpoint—wherein the structure becomes 
permanent, and therefore invisible—decolonizing work in a settler context requires 
insistence on the existence of the structure.9 Examining the Blount Report is one way to 
bring visibility to the settler foundations of Hawai’i, and through this process, 
decolonization is rendered “thinkable.”10 
 
II. The Blount Report: Background 
A. President Grover Cleveland 
President Grover Cleveland’s primary mark on history arises of his being the only 
U.S. President to serve two non-consecutive terms, but at the time he served as President, 
he was known for anti-imperialist views and fiscal conservatism. A democrat from New 
Jersey, he was touted by his party as being for “America first.”  
When Grover Cleveland took office for the second time in March of 1893, two 
months after Queen Lili’uokalani’s overthrow, he was presented with a Republican-
																																																						
5 Lorenzo Veracini, “Introducing Settler Colonial Studies,” Settler Colonial Studies, 1, no.1 (2011): 1.  
6 Ibid., at 3.   
7 Wolfe, “Elimination of the Native,” 388.  
8 Veracini, “Settler Colonial Studies,” 3. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Saito, “Racial Realism,” 103.   
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sponsored proposed treaty for annexation of Hawai’i.11 He learned that an American-led 
Provisional Government had been established in Hawai’i, and subsequently had been 
recognized as legitimate by U.S. Minister to Hawai’i, John L. Stevens and other foreign 
diplomats on the islands.  
Two elements related to the treaty attracted his concern.  First, Cleveland noted the 
precipitancy characterizing all the actions connected the treaty—from the original events 
leading to the formation of the provisional government to the submission of the 
annexation treaty, only 32 days had passed, and 15 of those days were the Commissioners’ 
travel time from Hawai’i to Washington.12  Additionally, Cleveland noted that Queen 
Lili’uokalani had acceded her throne to the government on the condition that a protest be 
sent to Washington.13  The Queen’s protest indicated that she yielded only because the U.S. 
Minister had landed U.S. troops in Honolulu in support of the insurrectionist 
government.14  This was at odds with documents accompanying the treaty in the Senate, 
which claimed that the Minister recognized the new government only after the Queen 
abdicated her throne, and no U.S. troops were involved. 15 
For Cleveland, the political consequences were obvious: to reject the treaty would 
be to thwart the Republicans and cast himself as an anti-imperialist, and to accept the treaty 
would be to sanction a reputed American coup.16  His decision, then, was to collect more 
facts before making a decision. Cleveland’s cabinet recommended Congressman James 
																																																						
11 Cleveland’s Message to Congress, 446.  
12 Ibid.   
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid., 447.  
15 Ibid., 446-47.  
16 Tennant S. McWilliams, “James H. Blount, the South, and Hawaiian Annexation,” Pacific Historical 
Review, 57, no. 1 (1988): 29. 
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Henderson Blount as an envoy to Hawai’i to collect the details of what actually had 
happened.17  
Less than a week after Cleveland took office, his Secretary of State Walter Gresham 
called on James Blount, asking for his service on the matter of Hawai’i. The official request 
from Cleveland to Blount was to investigate and to fully report upon “all the facts you can 
learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the 
revolution by which the Queen’s Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the 
people towards existing authority, and in general, all that can fully enlighten the President 
touching the subjects of your mission.”18   
 
B. Congressman James Henderson Blount & His Report 
James Blount was a leading advocate for the New South, having a strong reputation 
in his home state of Georgia as an attorney “devoted to his southland [and]…valiant in its 
defense.”19  Prior to his tenure in federal government, Blount served the Confederacy as a 
soldier with the Floyd Rifles in the Civil War, was elected as lieutenant colonel of the First 
Battalion of the Georgia Reserve Cavalry, and served as a delegate to Georgia’s 
constitutional convention in 1865.20  Blount made a name for himself opposing Yankee 
occupation and “Republican rule” in the south.21  In 1873, following Georgia’s reentry to 
the Union, Blount was elected to the House of Representatives, where he remained for 20 
years.  From 1890-1892, he chaired the House Foreign Affairs Committee.22 
																																																						
17 Ibid.  
18 Correspondence from Gresham to Blount, March 11, 1893. (Part I: No. 1), 467.   
19 McWilliams, “Blount, the South, and Annexation,” 26-27 (citing Atlanta Constitution, March 9, 
1903).  
20 Ibid., 26 (internal cites).  
21 Ibid., 27.  
22 Ibid.  
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Blount, though generally recognized as “one of the ablest members of the House,” 
with a “sturdy integrity [and] logical turn of mind,”23 espoused a particular set of 
Democratic partisan values which reveal an intentional choice on the part of Cleveland and 
his cabinet to frame the Hawai’i investigation.  Blount’s record reflects dedication to a 
homogenous Anglo-American ideal not dissimilar to prominent American political figures 
in 2018—arguing against civil rights acts in the 1870s “with delicately phrased arguments 
based on black inferiority,” and opposing expansion into Venezuela with the 
straightforward assertion of difference: “We have nothing in common with those 
people.”24  Whether Blount’s views emerged out of overt personal racism or a 
“preoccupation about Yankee expansionism” is unclear and presently irrelevant.25  Though 
Cleveland stated no “position” regarding Hawaiian annexation at the beginning of his 
presidential term, his selection of Blount to create the Report suggests a preference in the 
outcome.26  
Whatever his political affiliations or personal biases, Blount’s methods of 
investigation from the outset of his arrival in Hawai’i reflect an intention to gather all the 
pertinent facts, seeking information from persons of “all shades of political opinion” and 
nationalities.27 He took statements from wealthy businessmen and sugar farmers, officials 
of the court system, pro-Hawaiian sovereignty members of the Hawaiian Patriotic League, 
eyewitnesses to the military occupation, as well as the key players—U.S. Minister Stevens 
and Queen Lili’uokalani—themselves. Early letters sent to Secretary Gresham reflected no 
clear formation of Blount’s opinion—in one instance, alluding to the “perverted 
																																																						
23 Ibid., 27.   
24 McWilliams, “Blount, the South, and Annexation,” 28.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 30.   
27 Correspondence from Blount to Gresham, April 8, 1893. (Part I: No. 5), 475.  
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influence”28 of the presence of the U.S. military in Hawai’i, and shortly thereafter, critiquing 
the traditional Hawaiian governance system’s “blind devotion to arbitrary power.”29  
Tennant McWilliams, a scholar on the South, discusses that the situation in Hawai’i 
of a minority group seizing power and exercising it over a majority resonated with Blount 
in two adverse ways: on one hand, as a white Southern political elite who had attempted to 
and sometimes succeeded in exercising concentrated political power over Southern blacks 
and poor whites,30 and on the other, as a white southerner of the Reconstruction days 
subject to the unwanted authority of invading Yankee soldiers and politicians.31   
Blount’s final report shows that he exercised his “paramount” authority in the 
Hawaiian Islands with care.32 In his own words, “I have discharged my duty the best I 
could considering I was surrounded by persons interested in misleading me.”33 What 
resulted was indeed a comprehensive report (of more than 700 pages, including all 
attendant correspondences, interviews, and appendices) disparaging the actions leading up 
to the overthrow, and effectively documenting the case against any American 
administration from ever annexing Hawai’i.34  In the end, his Report laid out numerical 
data, public documents, and statements from at least 50 people35, and concluded that prior 
																																																						
28 Blount to Gresham, April 8, 1893 (Part I: No. 5,) 476.  
29 Blount to Gresham, April 26, 1893. (Part I: No. 6). 486.  
30 For discussion on the exercise of the minority group of white Southerners over the majority 
group of African Americans, see Gabriel Chin and Randy Wagner, “The Tyranny of the Minority: 
Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty,” Harvard Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review, 
43, (2008).  
31 McWilliams, “Blount, the South, and Annexation,” 37.  
32 See e.g. Blount to Gresham (Part I: No. 5), 475; Blount to Gresham July 19, 1893, Part I: No. 
18), 605 (“[This Report] …is based upon the statements of individuals and the examination of 
public documents…The partisan feeling naturally attaching to witnesses made it necessary for me 
to take time for forming a correct judgment as to their character.”).  
33 Blount to Gresham, July 31, 1893. (Part I, No: 17, following the Report) 630.  
34 McWilliams, “Blount, the South, and Annexation,” 39 (“The conclusion was not necessarily what 
Cleveland had in mind.”) 
35 List of Affidavits Statements (Part II), 630, and List of Statements and Interviews (Part III), 643.   
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to the overthrow in January 1893, “[t]he American minister and the revolutionary leaders 
had determined on annexation to the United States.”36  
The Blount Report and its related appendices serves as a useful tool for 
understanding Hawai’i’s settler colonial structure, in part, because of the rich diversity of 
first-hand perspectives on the overthrow and surrounding events, providing detailed 
insights on the foundation of the settler colonial structure.  In this way, the statements and 
interviews provided to Blount function as a primary source for the story of the overthrow 
and its significant preceding events.  At the same time, the Report and its documents 
provide unique clarity in terms of retrospective ability to understand exactly what 
information formed the basis for the action of the United States. While the conclusions in 
Blount’s Report clearly failed to control America’s subsequent actions, its continued 
existence functions importantly to shed light on America’s tactics in securing the islands as 
a state. The Report in its entirety has been described by Hawaiian sovereignty activists as 
the “single most damaging document against the United States.”37   
 
III. Colonial Foundations to a Settler Colonial State  
The Blount Report describes the “remote and proximate” causes of the revolution 
and eventual dethronement of Queen Lili’uokalani, and provides a historical glimpse of the 
structuring of a settler colonial society.38  The more “remote” events leading up to the 
overthrow as recounted by Blount are a series of colonial events—events that, taken alone, 
functioned to reinforce a relationship of difference between the white foreigner and the 
																																																						
36 Blount’s Report, 594.  
37 Trask, From a Native Daughter, 13.  
38 Blount’s Report, 569. 
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Native Hawaiian.39  The events more “proximate” to the 1893 overthrow demonstrate the 
intentions of Americans in Hawai’i to create a settler structure, whereby a white population 
and American way of life would replace the Native population and Hawaiian way of life.  
The overthrow itself is the culmination of a movement growing in favor of annexation to 
America. 
 
A. Missionaries to Oligarchs: Evolution of the American Colonizer in Hawai’i 
Following initial contact of British sailors in the late 1700s, Americans arrived in 
Hawai’i around the 1820s, largely as missionaries embodying the “civilizing mission” 
central to classic colonial ideology.40  Early stages of American Exceptionalism fueled 
missionaries who saw themselves as having “special obligations toward foreign missions” 
linked to the ideas of Manifest Destiny41 and territorial expansion, biblical commands to 
spread their superior culture, and “a fitful concern about the Indians.”42  The concomitant 
processes of “civilization” and “christianization” worked together in the missionaries’ 
assimilationist project.43 Capitalizing on Native Hawaiians’ interest in learning to read and 
write, missionaries provided reading materials based on religion, and ultimately used 
newspapers to “proselytize, to civilize, and to promote [American] ideals, such as farming 
for profit rather than subsistence.”44 
																																																						
39 Veracini “Settler Colonial Studies,” 3. 
40 Blount’s Report, 572; Saito, “Racial Realism,” 23.  
41 The term “manifest destiny” was coined in 1845. Julius W. Pratt, “The Origin of Manifest 
Destiny,” American Historical Review 32 (1927): 796.  
42 Noenoe K. Silva, Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism, (Durham: Duke 
Univ. Press, 2004): 31.  
43 Ibid., citing William Hutchinson, (“Hutchinson quotes the missionaries’ objectives as ‘civilizing 
and christianizing, in that order,’ and as assimilationist in vision.).  
44 Ibid., 33, 35.  
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According to the historical summary provided by Charles Gulick, one of the few 
missionary-descendants to side with the Queen during the overthrow, to Blount (the 
“Gulick History”), the reception of missionaries in Hawai’i “furnishes no parallel.”45  While 
colonization in other parts of the world has been “vigorously resented and repelled by 
force of arms,” the Native Hawaiian largely “welcomed his white visitor, encouraged to 
remain, adopted his religion and dress . . . sought his instruction, and finally asked his 
assistance in framing a government on a civilized model.”46  The earliest laws passed with 
the assistance of missionaries were Western in form, but still embodied principles 
fundamental to Native Hawaiian society and ways of life.47  While these missionaries 
sought to impose their “superior” language, culture, and systems on Native Hawaiians, 
their identities as colonizers and colonized remained fundamentally distinct, and their 
interests were perceived by neither side as fundamentally at odds.  
But over time, “[t]he revered missionary disappeared, [and] in his stead there came 
the Anglo-Saxon in the person of his son, ambitious to acquire wealth and to continue that 
political control reverently conceded to his pious ancestor.”48 These secular, politically 
ambitious white men born in Hawai’i to American evangelizing parents were still termed, 
satirically, as “missionaries” by Native Hawaiians to distinguish them from other foreign 
																																																						
45 Statement of Charles Gulick, “A footnote to Hawaiian History,” (hereinafter “Gulick History”) 
May 8, 1893. (Part III: No. 23), 749. Gulick was born to missionaries in Hawai’i, and was one of the 
few members of missionary families to side with the Queen after the overthrow.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 240, (Early laws “reflected Kanaka Maoli ideas of what was pono in 
government” Pono is “goodness, uprightness, morality…correct or property procedure, excellence, 
well-being, prosperity, welfare, benefit, sake…just, virtuous fair.” 
48 Blount’s Report, 572.   
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whites.49  To describe the missionary-descendants’ proclivity toward political power, they 
were often referred to as the “missionary party.”50  
Several factors are important to describe the situation of these missionary-
descendants and contextualize their impact on the formation of the settler colonial state.  
First, the missionary-descendants were born with a sense of superiority to Native 
Hawaiians, emerging from the “civilizing” project of their missionary ancestors.51  
Describing their view, Blount poses the question: “was it not natural for the white race to 
vaunt their wealth and intelligence, their Christian success in rescuing the native from 
barbarism?”  Second, because they were born in Hawai’i (many in Honolulu), the 
missionary descendants possessed a deeply held sense of sovereign entitlement to the land 
and political system in Hawai’i, and lacked a genuine connection with America as “home.” 
Finally, as Noenoe Silva points out, many of the missionary descendants traveled to the 
East Coast of the United States for higher education, where “racism…was the norm.”52  By 
the 1870s, the missionary descendants had taken over key roles in the government, and 
occupied positions to advise and instruct the Crown in all political matters.53 
During the missionary period, other white foreigners from America and Europe 
also arrived to Hawai’i, but “as a rule, did not become naturalized and participate in the 
voting franchise.”54  What the white foreigners and missionary descendants had in common 
was hopes for development of sugar plantations throughout the islands.55 Thus, operations 
																																																						
49 Ibid. 
50 Statement of W.D. Alexander, (Part III: No. 1), 660 (example of “missionary party” used to 
describe the white faction with sugar interests).  
51 Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 126.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Blount’s Report, 572.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 125.  
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of business and race occasioned “sympathy and cooperation” between missionary 
descendants and white foreign visitors.56  Eventually, these two groups together formed the 
“Reform Party,” intent on overcoming barriers to foreign trade with hopes of annexation 
to the United States.57 
 The Blount Report directs our attention to two primary means of colonization 
leading up to the overthrow of Queen Lili’uokalani.  First, the transformation of Hawaiian 
legal structures via the implementation (and subsequent amendment) of Western-style 
constitutions, the terms of which increasingly favored American interests over Native 
Hawaiian. Second, the gradual consolidation of land ownership and, by extension, wealth 
to white foreigners.  As the goals of Americans in Hawai’i evolved, changes in legal and 
economic structures began to pave the way for a settler structure to take root.   
 
B. Colonization through the Law: Constitutional Changes 
 The Blount Report’s documentation of the white-influenced constitutional changes 
occurring between 1852 and 1893 reflects the steady construction of foundations for a 
settler colonial society—white foreigners arrogated more power to themselves, while 
transforming the governmental structures of Hawai’i to accommodate their interests. This 
process of “colonial domination” was justified by the idea that white foreigners were 
spreading “civilization,” and therefore, any incidental subordination of Hawaiian interest 
was worthwhile.58   
																																																						
56 Blount’s Report, 572.  
57 Blount to Gresham, April 26, 1893. (Part I: No. 6), 467. (“The white race, or what may be termed 
the Reform party, constitute the intelligence and own most of the property in these islands and are 
desperately eager to be a part of the United States on any terms rather than take the chances of 
being subject to the control of the natives.”). 
58 Saito, “Racial Realism,” 24.  
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The passage of Hawai’i’s first Constitution took place in 1840 under the rule of 
King Kamehameha III (1825-1854), emerging out of widespread concern that Hawai’i was 
vulnerable to colonization and could not be recognized as a nation-state without one.59 
Following the passage of the Constitution, diplomats from Hawai’i were able to secure 
recognition of Hawai’i’s independence and sovereignty from the United States, Britain, and 
France, and further, were included as a member of the family of nations.60  This 
Constitution had two overarching goals: to preserve Hawai’i’s sovereignty, and to refute the 
accusations that Hawaiians were savage and uncivilized peoples.61  
 The promulgation of a new Constitution in 1852, still under King Kamehameha 
III, begins Blount’s presentation of the remote causes of the 1893 coup d’état and 
dethronement of Queen Lili’uokalani.  Under this constitutional system, Hawai’i had two 
legislative bodies: a House of Representatives, elected annually, and a House of Nobles, 
appointed by the King to serve life terms.62  Any male aged twenty or older who had 
resided in Hawai’i for at least one year and had paid taxes during that year was permitted to 
vote for or serve as the representative of his district.63 This instrument remained the 
governing law of Hawai’i for 12 years.  
 The “property qualification” was first introduced in the Constitution of 1864, 
through proclamation by King Kamehameha V (1863-1872).  This clause limited eligibility 
for legislative representatives to wealthy, property-owning men, for which white men were 
at a distinct advantage.  Only in the preceding decades had the concept of privately owned 
																																																						
59 Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 35-37.  
60 Ibid., 37.  
61 Ibid., 38-39. 
62 Blount’s Report, 569-70.  
63 Ibid., 570.  
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lands been introduced to Hawaiian society, with the passage of the Māhele law of 1848.64  
Consequently, Blount found, “the lands were so distributed between the Crown, the 
Government, the chiefs, and the people so as to leave the latter with an insignificant 
interest in the lands.”65  Ultimately, the chiefs became largely indebted to white foreigners, 
leading to disproportionate land occupation by white foreigners.66  In 1850 foreigners were 
authorized to purchase land in fee simple, resulting in “by far the larger part [of land] in the 
hands of foreigners,” used mostly for “sugar culture” and grazing.67 At the same time, non-
royal Native Hawaiians were being alienated from traditional lands.68  
Eligibility to be a representative required one to be a male, aged at least twenty-one, 
with the ability to read and write, having lived in Hawai’i for at least three years, and “who 
shall own real estate of at least five hundred dollars of value, or who shall have an annual 
income of at least $250 from any property or lawful employment.”69  White advisors to the 
King attempted to introduce a property qualification for voters as well (possession of real 
property valuing over $150, or income of at least $75 annually), but the King overruled this 
provision.70 Moreover, the Constitution of 1864 merged the elected Representatives and 
the appointed House of Nobles, a move “designed to strengthen the power of the Crown 
by removing a body distinctly representative,” thereby strengthening the power of white 
																																																						
64 Statement of W.D. Alexander (Hawai’i’s Surveyor General and land title historian, who Blount at 
552 describes on as the “highest authority” on Hawaiian land holdings) (providing a brief statement 
on the title of Crown lands), April 12, 1893 (Part III: No. 3), 666.  
65 Blount’s Report, 572.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Interview with Albert B. Lobenstein (surveyor and civil engineer), April 11, 1893. (Part III: No. 
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influence.71  According to W.D. Alexander (a missionary-descendant and surveyor-general 
of Hawai’i), the constitutional amendments of 1864 had two purposes: “making Ministers 
responsible only to people through the legislature, and to widen the suffrage by extending 
it to foreigners, who until then had been practically barred from naturalization.”72 
Through the constitutional changes up to 1864, there was some opposition from 
Native Hawaiians to the growing power of white missionaries and foreigners,73 but the 
Crown was mostly stable.  Many Hawaiians, especially those who were Royal, bought into 
the idea that the changes suggested by white advisors were for the benefit of Hawai’i, and 
were comfortable with the distribution of power. As a result, it was rare that any King 
changed his ministry or cabinet of advisors, and many of the advisors had a “long lease on 
political life,” allowing them to systematically advance their own interests.74 At this 
point,“[t]he Crown appointed the nobles generally from white men of property and 
intelligence.”75 
At the convergence of the missionary generation and the missionary-descendant 
generation, the “dynamic of difference” between American and Hawaiian was consistently 
reinforced, where colonizers effectively cast their own culture as “universal” and civilized 
and Hawaiian culture as “particular” and uncivilized.76 The missionaries had “devoted 
themselves to the improvement of the native”77 and spread their civilizing message for four 
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decades, and throughout that time still maintained a connection to America as the 
metropole.78  Also, the Crown still maintained power; the missionaries had neither desire 
nor incentive to seize complete governmental control.  Blount marks 1866 as the end of 
the Missionary Period, after which the sons of the missionaries (i.e. the ‘Missionary Party’) 
“sought to succeed to the political control exercised by their fathers.”79  
 
The Missionary Party and The Bayonet Constitution 
Balance between American influence and the Crown’s legitimate authority was 
curtailed as the Missionary Party gained power. King Kalākaua (1874-1891) reigned during 
this period, after prevailing in an election against Kamehameha IV’s widow, Queen 
Dowager Emma (the choice among Native Hawaiians).80 Despite reservations about 
Kalākaua, the Missionary Party and foreign sugar plantationers backed him during the 
election with hopes that he would help secure a reciprocity treaty with the United States, 
allowing them to sell their sugar to the U.S. market duty-free.81  Volney V. Ashford, an 
American soldier and member of the Missionary Party, who later helped orchestrate the 
overthrow, conceded that, “Kalākaua was not selected for his virtues, but simply because 
he could be controlled.”82 The reciprocity treaty was secured in 1876.83   
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Political instability increased greatly under Kalākaua, who had 26 different cabinets 
during his time (where previous monarchs rarely changed cabinets at all).84  Legislative 
issues, including an opium bribe and a failed effort to unite the Samoan Islands with the 
Kingdom of Hawai’i, brought critique of Kalākaua from both his supporters and 
opposition.85   
 The unpredictability of Kalākaua led the Missionary Party and supporters to this 
conclusion: “The native is unfit for government and his power must be curtailed.”86  
Consequently, two factions prevailed among the white foreigners: those in favor of 
restraining the King’s power, and those in favor of dethroning the King and establishing a 
Republic, under which Natives would not be allowed to vote at all.87  For the time being, 
the more conservative view prevailed.  
All of this leads to the “Bayonet Constitution” in 1887, a drastic constitutional 
change implemented without a popular vote, and indeed, without the support of King 
Kalākaua himself.88  The term “Bayonet Constitution” refers to the fact that the King was 
practically forced at gunpoint to accept its terms. Prior to this revolutionary move, “large 
quantities of arms had been brought by a secret league from San Francisco and placed 
amongst its members.”89  Chief Justice Judd recounted to Blount, “I knew that [the King] 
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felt it would be very dangerous to refuse to promulgate the new constitution.”90 When 
pressed further by Blount, Judd explained that the Kalākaua was intimidated by the “large 
and well-drilled force” ordered by Volney Ashford (known as the Honolulu Rifles), as well 
as the threat that he might be forced by the same group to abdicate the throne altogether if 
he did not concede to the new Constitution.91 
Under this Constitution, almost all executive power was stripped from the 
Crown—the King could no longer take any action without approval of his cabinet.  The 
right to appoint nobles was taken away from the King and instead decided by a vote, with a 
property qualification of $3,000 worth of property, or an annual income of $600, thus 
primarily empowering white Americans and Europeans.  Whites had around three-fourths 
of the vote and Natives had around one-fourth.92  The number of representatives and 
nobles was equalized, such that legislative power of the elected representatives was diluted 
by the appointed nobles, and the nobles were granted veto power over decisions made by 
the representatives. While the King was able to appoint a cabinet, cabinet members could 
not be removed except “at the pleasure of the legislature, or, to speak practically, on the 
favor of certain foreigners, Americans and Europeans.”93 
In addition to removing power from the King and legislature, the Bayonet 
Constitution and its proponents sought to “neutralize” the Native vote as much as 
possible, which satiated the aforementioned faction wanting to eliminate the Native vote.94 
In pursuit of this, certain unnaturalized foreigners were granted the right to vote for 
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representatives of the district in which they resided after swearing to a certified oath.  A 
specially crafted exception to the two provisions limiting the right to vote permitted 
imported laborers from Portugal to vote as well, and on election day, they were taken from 
cane fields by their overseer, administered the oath to support the Constitution, and 
directed to the polls.95 Generally not able to speak or write in English, the Portuguese were 
essentially guaranteed to “vote according to the will of the plantation manager” and 
therefore “balance the native vote.”96  
The first election under this Constitution took place with the Ashfordʻs Honolulu 
Rifles stationed all around the island, and the “troops hostile to the crown.”97   
Blount marks the Bayonet Constitution as a turning point in Hawai’i, after which 
the people could be divided by “native and foreigner.”98  He clarifies that “race hostility” 
itself was not the basis for division, but rather the “attempted control of the country by a 
population of foreign origin . . . zealously holding allegiance to foreign powers.”99  
According to the Hui Kalaiana’s (a Hawaiian Political Association), statement to Blount, 
there were five reasons that Native Hawaiians opposed the terms of the Bayonet 
Constitution: (1) It deprived the Crown of the Hawaiian Islands of its ancient prerogatives; 
(2) it based the principles of government on the forms and spirit of republican 
governments; (3) it opens the way to a republican government; (4) it took the sovereign 
power and vested it outside of the King sitting on the throne; and (5) it limited the 
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franchise of the Native Hawaiians.100  On these bases, King Kalākaua and, later, 
Lili’uokalani were petitioned to revise the Constitution.101   
The Bayonet Constitution foreshadows the structuring of a true settler colonial 
society.  In the earlier iterations of Hawai’i’s Constitution, missionaries concentrated power 
to the Crown, but with the Bayonet Constitution, the missionary-descendants took power 
from the Crown and vested it directly into a body comprised of themselves.  This 
transformation marks a change from Americans imposing their structures on the Hawaiian 
government toward acting as settlers, directly ruling over Native Hawaiians, with the view 
of dissolving the Native Hawaiian society completely.102  The fundamental difference 
between the Missionary Party and their predecessors is that they had no inclination to 
leave.  In order to protect their interests in perpetuity, they strove to eliminate the Native 
power altogether.103 
Settler states establish, maintain, and protect their hegemony by exercising 
virtually complete control over Indigenous peoples . . . Settlers presume a 
prerogative to determine…which peoples will be accorded particular civil or 
political rights, and the extent to which settler privilege will be promoted and 
protected by the state.104 
 
C. Colonizing the Land: Sugar Plantations in Hawai’i 
Occupation of land and use of resources is central to colonial and settler colonial 
societies alike.  Classic colonial regimes tend to involve “exploitation of the land, labor, and 
natural resources of territories where, for the most part, the colonists do not intend to 
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settle permanently,” unlike settler colonial regimes.105  Early American missionaries, 
arriving in Hawai’i for their civilizing mission, seized on opportunities to gain personal 
wealth from sugar profits, and leveraged their contacts in the government to buy large 
tracts of land.106 Under Kamehameha III, the Māhele system of land privatization was 
introduced, and shortly thereafter, white foreigners were allowed to purchase land in fee 
simple. As a result, “[s]ometimes the line between mission work and establishing 
plantations became indistinguishable.”107 
While missionaries arrived to the islands to pursue civilizing missions, they (and 
especially their descendants) stayed for the sugar profit.  Through the legal changes enacted 
under the influence of the missionaries, their descendants and other white foreigners seized 
so much land that it only made sense for them to stay, giving rise to the settler colonial 
structure.  For settler colonizers, a “primary purpose is to establish a territorial base, for 
this is what allows them to create and control a society of their own imagining, and to 
generate the profits that enable them to consolidate and expand their sovereign 
prerogative.”108   
By 1870, the civilizing work of the missionaries had been almost entirely 
abandoned and the political Missionary Party became driven by a desire for more sugar 
wealth.109  The American tariff on imported goods stood as the primary barrier to 
otherwise accessible “opulence.”110  According to the Gulick History, three methods for 
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overcoming the tariff were considered: annexation, reciprocity, or a remission of duties on 
Hawaiian products entering American markets.111 But annexation was generally unpopular 
in Hawai’i, and remission of duties seemed impossible from the American standpoint, so 
the focus turned toward consummating a treaty of reciprocity with America.112  As 
discussed above, Americans found the candidate most likely to secure the treaty in the 
election of 1874 in David Kalākaua.  
King Kalākaua’s reign led to the passage of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875. Per the 
treaty, there would be free importation into the United States all forms of sugar, sugar 
cane, and molasses produced in Hawai’i.113  Blount summarizes the result: 
From it, there came to the islands an intoxicating increase of wealth, a new 
labor system, an Asiatic population, an alienation between the native and white 
races, an impoverishment of the former, an enrichment of the latter, and the 
many so-called revolutions, which are the foundation for the opinion that 
stable government cannot be maintained.114 
 
 Ten years after the 1875 Treaty, imported labor had reached striking proportions. 
Of 14,439 laborers on plantations, only 2,136 were Native Hawaiians and the remainder 
were imported—immigrants of the “poor and ignorant classes.”115  The importance of 
labor prompted almost exclusively by white sugar planters was an early test of the 
“sovereign prerogative” and an indication that these missionary-descendants were 
entrenched in Hawai’i with no plans to leave.  Moreover, this prefaced a complicated 
relationship between Native Hawaiians and non-settler (i.e. non-property owning) 
migrants.  With the presence of the new working classes, Native Hawaiians were (and still 
are) left unemployed.  This is described by the term “conceptual displacement.”  Having 
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had both positions of power and labor taken from them and replaced by foreign 
populations, Native Hawaiians were beginning to be conceptually “eliminated” from their 
own society.116 
 The McKinley Tariff of 1890 limited the sugar plantationers’ access to extreme 
wealth by removing the preferential treatment of Hawaiian sugar in the American market 
and granting domestic producers a bounty of two cents per pound.117  Framed by Ohio 
Congressman William McKinley (who later succeeded Cleveland to the Presidency), the 
Act was passed to protect American business interests.118 As a result, the price of sugar 
dropped from 100 to 60 dollars a ton, and it is estimated that the tariff cost sugar planters 
$12,000,000 in depreciation.119  The sugar planters thus recognized that the manipulation of 
legal structures within the Kingdom of Hawai’i would be insufficient to protect their profit 
increases.   
In sum, over half a century, Americans manipulated the Hawaiian government to 
introduce private land ownership, secured a treaty that benefitted themselves exclusively at 
cost of Hawaiian’s natural resources, excluded Hawaiians from the jobs thus created—and 
when Hawaiians protested, concluded that they were so unstable as to not be capable of 
self-government. 
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IV. Settler Colonial Structure & the Role of the United States 
Annexation to the United States became the primary goal of the Missionary Party 
around the passage of the McKinley Tariff of 1890, marking clearly the transformation of 
their intentions from colonization to a permanent settler structure.  The formative colonial 
events laid out above, and the gradual, generational evolution from missionary to 
Reformer, took place over several decades; by contrast, the institution of a settler colonial 
structure was as abrupt and explosive as might have been the volcanic eruptions that 
created the islands of Hawai’i millions of years ago.120 
Blount explains, “[t]he repeal of the duty on sugar in the McKinley act was 
regarded as a severe blow to their interests . . . Annexation has for its charm the complete 
abolition of all duties on their exports to the United States.”121  Moreover, through 
annexation, the Missionary Party would be able to “supersede the conditions of its 
operation” by no longer having to bet on the success of obtaining a majority in the 
monarch’s cabinet. 122  The Reformers would secure their positions of power by replacing 
the Kingdom of Hawai’i (to which they would always be foreigners) with the American 
Territory Hawai’i (which they would rule as sovereigns).123  The distinction between “native 
and foreigner,” so prevalent since the Bayonet Constitution, would be replaced by a 
uniform “American identity.” 
The U.S. Minister to Hawai’i, John L. Stevens, “zealously promoted” annexation 
and would play a critical role in the overthrow. 124  Prior to the overthrow, he independently 
declared favor of annexation, as early as 1889 when he assumed the role as U.S. Minister to 
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Hawai’i.125  According to Charles Gulick, Stevens made it known shortly after his arrival to 
the Kingdom, that “he considered annexation to the United States as not only the ultimate 
manifest destiny of the little country, but that it would be just as well to hasten the 
event.”126  Unsurprisingly, this was not well-received by most in the Hawaiian government. 
In his very first meeting with King Kalākaua (who was in power at the time he came to 
Hawai’i as Minister), he hinted at annexation in such an “offensive” way that Kalākaua 
nearly demanded his recall.127 
Stevens’s inclination toward annexation appears to be backed by the dual bases of 
American business and military interests—an 1890 letter to Secretary of State James Blaine 
reads:  
Shall American civilization ultimately prevail here? The near future is to show 
conclusively that only the strong pressure and continual vigilance of the United 
States can enable American men and American ideas to hold ascendency here 
and make these islands as prosperous and valuable to American commerce, and 
to American marine supremacy in the North Pacific, as the isles of the 
Mediterranean have been and are to its adjacent nations.128 
 
Moreover, Stevens’s advocacy for annexation was consistently reinforced by the necessity 
of “civilization” and critiques of the Hawaiian’s ability to run an effective government.  In 
a November 20, 1892 letter to John W. Foster, Secretary of State in President Harrison’s 
administration, he described the Hawaiian monarchy as an “absurd anachronism” and 
articulated the absolute necessity of annexation or at the very least extending an American 
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protectorate over the islands.129 By this point (only three months before the overthrow), in 
Stevens’s view, Hawai’i had reached a “parting of the ways” at which “[s]he must now take 
the road which leads to Asia, or the other, which outlets her in America, gives her an 
American civilization, and binds her to the care of American destiny.”130 That letter 
concluded: “I cannot refrain from expressing the opinion with the emphasis that the 
golden hour is near at hand.”131  A few weeks after the overthrow, he confirmed his 
continuing support for the cause: “The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe and this is the 
golden hour for the United States to pluck it.”132 
As to Stevens’s role in the overthrow, Blount concludes: “The American minister 
and the revolutionary leaders had determined on annexation to the United States, and had 
agreed on the part each was to act to the very end.”133  President Cleveland appeared to 
accept Blount’s portrayal of Stevens’s role, stating in his letter to Congress that “[Stevens] 
evidently had an ardent desire that [annexation] should become a fact accomplished by his 
agency and during his ministry, and was not inconveniently scrupulous as to the means 
employed to that end.”134 
 
A. The Overthrow of Queen Lili’uokalani 
As a man who, for years, has taken an active part in Hawaiian politics, and as 
a practical sugar planter of many years’ experience, it is not difficult for me to 
realize the true cause for the late revolution and for the subsequent desire for 
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annexation. The depression in the sugar business which, since the passage of 
the McKinley bill, has made havoc with the handsome dividends which we 
have enjoyed since 1875, and the loss of power by the reform party were the 
only true reasons for the revolution. The prospects of the sugar bounty was and is the 
main motive for the desire to be annexed on the part of the handful of responsible men who 
still desire such step to be taken.135  
 
 
Political Divisions in the Queen’s Legislature   
 
The events proximate to the overthrow reveal desperation and anxiety on the part 
of the Missionary Party, who for all its trouble to consolidate wealth and power to 
themselves, was failing to fully silence and disenfranchise Native Hawaiians. A decision by 
the Queen to act in favor of her subjects provided the missionaries an opportunity to 
scapegoat—consistent with colonial policy to “make war and call it self-defense.”136  
Queen Lili’uoklani took over as ruling monarch after the death of her brother King 
Kalākaua in 1891. At this time, the Missionary Party and other foreigners officially 
organized into the “Reform Party.”  There were three prevailing political parties with 
balanced representation in the legislature: Liberal, National Reform and Reform.137  
Liberals wanted to revert to the pre-1887 mode of selecting nobles done exclusively by the 
monarch, and the National Reform Party wanted constitutional reform reducing the 
property qualification of voters for nobles.138  The Reform Party, having initiated both 
changes, wanted neither, and had their sights set on annexation to the United States.139  
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Between early 1891 and late 1892, at least six cabinets composed by the Queen were 
removed by a “resolution of want of confidence” from the legislature, as was the right 
reserved to the legislature by the 1887 Bayonet Constitution.140  Each of these no-
confidence votes were initiated by the Reform Party, but would not have been successful 
without support from members of the other two parties.  One Reformer explains their 
stance—“to carry out their objective [to rule the cabinet] they would join hands with the 
devil if necessary.”141  According to members of the legislature at the time, the votes of the 
other parties were secured by offering bribes via periodic financial support to Native 
members of the legislatures, which were funded by “a large sugar plantation owner.”142  
Apprehension about the cabinet and “struggles for power” intensified as the prorogation 
became more imminent—once the Queen prorogued the legislature, the legislature would 
not officially meet for two years, and whatever cabinet was in power at the time of had 
control of public affairs until the next assembly two years later.143  
 The Reformers nearly succeeded in occupying the cabinet for the prorogation 
period. Queen Lili’uokalani appointed the “Wilcox Cabinet,” comprised exclusively of 
Reform Party members in November of 1892.144  The Queen made this decision after 
consulting with local businessmen, unhappy with the reality that the legislature was 
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accomplishing nothing but the repeated turnover of cabinet members.145  But on January 
13, 1893, members of the other two parties, frustrated at the Reform Party’s exclusion of 
them, voted out the Wilcox Cabinet.146  Subsequently, Lili’uokalani appointed an anti-
reform cabinet—two representatives from Hawai’i, and two foreign—and the next day, the 
legislature was prorogued before any successful attempt to reorganize the cabinet was 
made.147 
The removal of the Wilcox Cabinet and institution of the anti-reform cabinet 
produced as much excitement among the majority of people (especially Native Hawaiians) 
as it did discontentment among reformers—and for the reformers, this was a tipping point 
for making moves in favor of annexation.148  Blount describes the situation for the 
reformers as “verging on . . . political crisis.”  They knew that the cabinet change meant 
losing their power and influence in Hawai’i for years to come, and they were openly 
hostile.149  At the same time, Native Hawaiians were encouraged by other Hawaiians 
serving on the Queen’s cabinet and believed that “race prejudice . . . would wear away and 
the Hawaiians and foreigners would work together.”150  
Queen Lili’uokalani, responsive to innumerable requests from her Native subjects, 
perceived an opportunity to overhaul the Bayonet Constitution.  Leading up to the 
prorogation, the Queen had received a petition signed by 9,000 of her native subjects 
asking for a new constitution, and “thought this was an opportune time to grant their 
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prayer.”151 Her proposed changes included adding official heirs to the throne, restoring the 
Queen’s right to appoint nobles, increasing elected representatives, and limiting supreme 
court appointments temporally.152 Her cabinet disagreed, however, and ultimately prevailed 
upon her that proclaiming a constitution was not in the interests of the country.153  
Apparently persuaded by the unanimous opinion of her cabinet, Queen Lili’uokalani 
abandoned the idea, making a public announcement to that effect on the same day, January 
14, 1893.154  In response, one delegate from Lahaina provided that, “while the people 
regretted the Queen’s inability to grant the wishes of the people, they would accept the 
assurances of the Queen and await the proper time, which…[may be] the meeting of the 
Legislature in 1894.”155  These remarks were later reported in foreign-run newspapers as 
being “incendiary and threatening.”156 But according to parties present in the palace, the 
people dispersed quietly and were generally accepting of the Queen’s decision.157   
On January 16, the Queen again issued a proclamation to the people confirming 
that she would not make any further attempt to change the Bayonet Constitution, and she 
sent a message to Minister Stevens and other foreign representatives to that effect.  
However, her assurances did not slow the ambitions of the Annexationists, who had 
already begun organizing a plan to dethrone her.  
 
																																																						
151 Blount’s Report, 499; Statement from the Hui Kalaiaina (Hawaiian Political Association) (Part I: 
No. 6), 484. (“On the 14th of January, 1893, at the time of the prorogation of the Legislature . . . 
this political association came and petitioned her Majesty Liliʻuokalani to issue a new constitution 
for the people, to which she consented, with the intention of listening to the desires of her people, 
but her cabinet refused.”).  
152 Draft of Constitution of January 14, 1893, (Part IV: No. 2), 1055-056.  
153 Statement from Colburn, (Part I: No. 6: Inclosure 6), 498.  
154 Statement from Cornwell, (Part I: No. 6: Inclosure 5), 494.  
155 Ibid.  
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 
31 
 
 
1. The Citizens’ Committee of Safety 
Women and children passed to and fro through the streets, seemingly 
unconscious of any impending danger, and yet there were secret conferences 
held by a small body of men.  [On] the 14th of January, they took up the subject 
of dethroning the Queen and proclaiming a new Government with a view of 
annexation to the United States.158   
 
 Members of the Queen’s cabinet had been in communication with Reform Party 
leaders throughout the process of the potential constitutional reform—and in so doing, 
had unintentionally set into motion the formation of a group imminently intending to 
overthrow the Queen.  John Francis Colburn, the Queen’s Interior Minister, “felt as 
though [the new Cabinet] should place [themselves] in the right light before the foreign 
element of the community,” in light of the hostility following the dissolution of the Wilcox 
Cabinet and the potential for the new constitution to upset their interests further.159  
Ironically, Colburn sought to prevent the type of insurrectionist movement that ultimately 
ensued as a result of his actions.  Blount concludes that learning of the Queen’s 
proclamation gave the politically impaired Reform Party an opportunity to carry forward 
with revolutionary plans for which the replacement of the Wilcox Cabinet formed the 
foundation.160  
As a clear political minority who “fear[ed] arrest and imprisonment,” if they acted 
on their annexationist intent, the Reformers sought physical force and a legal basis to 
support their revolutionary actions.161  “The first and most momentous question with them 
was to devise some plan to have the United States troops landed.”162  First, the Reformers 
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attempted to persuade the cabinet members to turn against the Queen and call for support 
of U.S. troops.163  Concerned about the consequences of the overthrow, the reformers 
believed the action “should appear to be done by a part of her own cabinet or a portion of 
the government.”164   After the Queen’s Minister Colburn disclosed the Queen’s plans to 
alter the Constitution to the Reformers, he was furnished with an official request to land 
troops from the U.S.S. Boston (an American Navy ship) and “render support,” asked to sign 
it as if it he wrote it himself, and told that the document would only be delivered in case 
the Queen jailed him.165  Colburn declined, assuring the reformers that it was not necessary, 
because the Queen had abandoned the idea of a new constitution.166  Undeterred, the 
Reformers tried again the next day to convince Colburn and another cabinet member to 
depose the Queen, declare a provisional government, and sign a request to Minister 
Stevens to land the troops of the Boston—this time, with the vague threat that if they did 
not comply, they “could not receive aid and support from them in the future” if it was 
needed.167  Still, the cabinet members declined.  
Unsuccessful in leveraging the legitimacy this faction of the existing government, 
the reformers formed a thirteen-person “Citizens’ Committee of Safety” with the stated 
purpose of “protecting life and property.”168  On January 16, 1893—only two days after the 
prorogation and Queen Lili’uokalani’s constitutional announcement—they called a mass 
meting of Honolulu citizens to “authorize the committee to take steps to prevent a 
consummation of the Queen’s purposes and to have guarantees of public safety.”169  There 
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was no disclosure of their intentions for either dethronement or annexation “for fear of 
proceedings against them by the government of the Queen.”170 The committee then sent 
Stevens the following letter: 
To His Excellency John L. STEVENS, American Minister Resident:  
SIR: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu, 
respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this 
Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Lili’uokalani on 
Saturday last, the public safety is menaced and lives and property are in peril, and we 
appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.  
The Queen, with the aid of armed force and accompanied by threats of 
violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted 
to proclaim a new constitution; and while prevented for the time from 
accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her 
action.  
This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances 
which have created general alarm and terror.  
We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and, therefore, pray for 
the protection of the United States forces.171 
[ * * * ] 
       Citizen’s Committee of Safety.  
Minister Stevens, despite living in Honolulu himself and therefore aware of the 
placid conditions among the community and the factual inaccuracies represented by the 
letter, consented to the Committee’s request. Indeed, Stevens has independent 
responsibility for the landing of the troops. Shortly after the mass meeting and sending of 
the letter, representatives from the Committee approached Stevens and requested a delay 
for the landing of the troops, deciding they were not ready, a request that “exposed the 
untruthfulness of their representations of present peril to life and property,” as President 
Cleveland later noted.172  Stevens responded: “Gentlemen, the troops of the Boston land this 
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afternoon at 5 o’clock, whether you are ready or not.”173  The same day, U.S. troops landed 
in Honolulu and “a great surprise burst about the community,” with only the Committee 
knowing of their purpose.174  Without a bona fide purpose of protecting imperiled lives and 
property of U.S. citizens, the military demonstration was of itself, an “act of war.”175  
The Committee’s final meeting—at the home of Henry Waterhouse, neighbor of 
Minister Stevens—took place the night of January 16, the same day as the Committee’s 
first mass meeting and the landing of the troops, and the morning before the official 
declaration of dethronement.176  At that meeting, the group assigned various governmental 
roles to other members present, including Sanford Dole (cousin of the originator of Dole 
Pineapples) as President of the Provisional Government.177  The designee for commander 
of the military force, Colonel John Soper (an American citizen), demurred multiple times at 
the suggestion that he should take that position, expressing concern that there would be no 
backing for the movement.178  Ultimately, Soper and others spoke to Minister Stevens 
directly, who assured them fully that “any proclamation of the [Provisional] Government 
put forward at the Government building . . . would receive his immediate recognition and 
the support of the Boston’s men.”179  This sequence in itself demonstrates that, but for the 
support of Stevens, the actions of the Committee were far from certain to go forward.  
Thus, having the unconditional support of the U.S. military and Minister Stevens, 
the primary diplomat in Hawai’i, the Committee of Safety’s plans to dethrone the Queen 
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and take over as Provisional Government were solidified, and annexation was for the first 
time clearly in view.  
The annexationists’ decision to portray themselves as the Committee of “Safety” 
was no accident, and plays directly into the typical formation of a settler colonial society.  
In order to function and be regarded as legitimate, settler societies “need to demonstrate, 
continuously, that humanity at large will benefit from accepting its social and political 
structures and internalizing its worldview.”180  The irony was contemporarily apparent, too, 
as shown through the Gulick History, furnished to Blount for his Report on May 8, 1893, 
which states: “The revolutionary annexationists, in justification of their action, raised the 
old cry of 1887, of the necessity of stable government, proper representation, honest 
administration, prevention of riot and bloodshed, maintenance of law and order, etc., when 
as a matter of fact there is not now, and never has been, the least danger of disorder or opposition to 
law except at the hand of the revolutionists themselves.”181  
Moreover, Blount observes that “they claim to be a citizens’ committee of safety” 
and not “simply applicants for the protection of the property and lives of American 
citizens.”182  This decision has two overlapping explanations.  On one (practical) hand, this 
identification builds a record in support of a later assertion that the dethronement of the 
Queen was the will of the people, providing legitimacy for their claim of self-defense.  On 
another (ideological) hand, the Reformers were preparing for their envisioned not-so-
distant future, where they ruled Hawai’i as sovereign leaders.  
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2. Forming the Provisional Government 
The Committee of Safety, to use their own language, say: “We are unable to 
protect ourselves without aid, and therefore, pray for the protection of the 
United States forces. In less than thirty hours, [these] petitioners have overturned 
the throne, established a new government, and obtained the recognition of 
foreign power.183 
 
The promises of Minister Stevens and the backing of the U.S. military empowered 
the annexationists to transform from a mere Citizens’ Committee of Safety to the 
Provisional Government of Hawai’i.  Which they did—on January 17th, only three days 
after Queen Lili’uokalani’s attempted promulgation.  With the U.S. Marines strategically 
positioned,184 the annexationists descended upon a mostly empty Government building and 
read a proclamation declaring that the monarchy was overthrown and that a Provisional 
Government would “exist until terms of union with the United States of America has been 
negotiated and agreed upon.”185  
“It was pressed upon [the Queen] . . . that it was useless for her to make any 
contest, because it was one with the United States.” 186 A meeting between the Queen, her 
cabinet, and the Provisional Government’s vice-president Samuel Damon (who was in 
good standing with the queen) took place shortly thereafter, wherein the Queen was 
advised that the provisional government had already been recognized by Minister Stevens 
and was backed by American troops.187 The Queen was advised to yield under protest, and 
wrote addressed to Washington indicating her intent: 
 
																																																						
183 Blount’s Report, 587 (emphasis added).  
184 Ibid., (quoting Admiral Skerrett saying that the American troops from the Boston were “well 
located if designed to promote the movement for the Provisional Government and very improperly 
located if only intended to protect American citizens in person and property.”).  
185 Correspondence from Gresham to Cleveland, October 18, 1893, 463.  
186 Blount’s Report, 586; Affidavit of Peterson and Colburn (members of the Queen’s cabinet 
present at the meeting) (Part I: No. 7: Inclosure 8), 524. 
187 Blount’s Report, 590.  
37 
 
Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, 
under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such 
time as they Government of the United States shall…undo the action of its 
representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the 
constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.188  
 
Following the letter of protest, the Queen offered up the station-house and barracks, where 
the island’s primary military force was held.189   
 
B. The Role of the United States: Legitimating the Coup 
‘Legitimate,’ like ‘sanction,’ is a Janus word, one that refers simultaneously 
to a concept and its opposite. To ‘legitimate’ means to bring power under 
the rule of law so that it is (sufficiently) just, impartial, or otherwise worthy 
of respect. But to ‘legitimate’ also means to apologize for or mystify the 
exercise of power so that it seems to be just, impartial and worthy of respect 
whether or not that is so.190 
 
 The looming influence of the United States in all the decisions and events leading 
up to the overthrow is demonstrated throughout Blount’s Report, and it shapes his 
conclusions.  But for the promise of Minister Stevens to protect them from any danger 
from the government, the leaders of the Committee of Safety would not have undertaken 
the dethronement at this time.191  But for the Queen’s conviction that the American 
minister and American troops were siding with the provisional government, and that the 
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appeal to the U.S. government was the only possibility to render justice to her, she would 
not have surrendered.   
Even with the support of Minister Stevens and the Boston’s Marines, why would the 
story of Hawai’i’s sovereignty end with act of the overthrow?  In his final letter from 
Honolulu to Secretary of State Gresham, Blount observes: “The present government can 
only rest on the use of military force, possessed of most of the arms on the islands, with a 
small white population to draw from to strengthen it. Ultimately it will fall without fail.”192 
Alone, the Provisional Government would likely have lost traction and eventually have 
fallen out of power, leaving the settler framework to crumble—Trask characterizes the 
1893 events as a “prelude to the extinguishment of Hawaiian sovereignty,” rather than an 
act of extinguishment in itself.193  An outright rejection of the provisional government by 
America would have resulted in the restoration of Queen Lili’uokalani’s rightful power.  
Viewed in the context of President Cleveland’s condemnation on the overthrow before 
Congress, his own espoused anti-imperialist beliefs, and the conclusions set forth in the 
Blount Report, one might reasonably suggest that restoring Hawai’i’s sovereignty and the 
Queen’s power was the likely outcome. 194 Still today, President Cleveland is often viewed 
favorably by Hawaiian sovereignty advocates, as not a true imperialist, but having intention 
to restore Lili’uokalani’s power, unfortunately unable to do so for political reasons.195 To 
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view Cleveland as so helpless misrepresents his presidential power, and denies his true 
culpability in sanctioning and legitimating the settler state.  
Instead of directly rejecting the power of the provisional government, Cleveland 
first conditioned further action on the Queen’s “unqualified agreement” to “grant full 
amnesty” to all those who acted to set up or support the provisional government.196  By 
constraining Queen Lili’uokalani’s punishment of the insurrectionists, Cleveland overtly 
undermined the sovereignty that he “deem[ed] it his duty to endeavor to restore.”197  Surely 
an action by a small group of foreigners to threaten the executive power in the United 
States would not be met with such charitable amnesty.  
At the same time, Cleveland obfuscated the scope of his executive power and left it 
to the same Republican-controlled Congress that supported annexation in the first place.  
In his address prefacing the Blount Report, he states: “In commending this subject to the 
extended powers and wide discretion of Congress, I desire to add the assurance that I shall 
be much gratified to cooperate in any legislative plan which may be devised for the solution 
of the problem before us which is consistent with American honor, integrity, and 
morality.”198 Even though Cleveland rejected President Harrison’s initial treaty for 
annexation, by shifting the ultimate prerogative to Congress, and in the meantime 
validating the existence of the provisional government, he essentially guaranteed that the 
foreign government would endure.  Meanwhile, in Hawai’i, “[a]ll minds were quietly and 
anxiously looking to see what action the Government of the United States would take.”199 
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Within Congress, “a distinct polarity prevailed,” and many in favor of annexation 
critiqued Blount and his role as envoy to Hawai’i.200  First, Senator George F. Hoar of 
Massachusetts proposed a resolution questioning the constitutionality of Blount’s 
instructions, as well as his general conduct in Hawai’i.201  Other senators espoused similar 
beliefs, arguing that the “paramountcy” with which Cleveland had vested Blount 
necessitated confirmation hearings that had not occurred.202  Even more, Senator Shelby 
Cullom from Illinois accused Blount of being a spy, and described Blount’s lowering of the 
American flag in Honolulu as “treasonous,” invoking a comparison to a Confederate 
soldier removing the American flag in New Orleans who received death by hanging.203 
In February 1894, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee sent Senator John Tyler 
Morgan to Hawai’i on “fact-finding” mission, that appeared to be for the express purpose 
of rebuking the findings in the Blount Report.  The conclusions were in favor of 
annexation, and found that the only party at fault was Queen Lili’uokalani. Morgan 
reported:  
Under [Queen Lili’uokalani’s] brief rule, it was kept alive by the care and 
forbearing tolerance of the conservative white people, who owned 
$50,000,000 of the property in Hawaii, until they saw that the Queen 
and her party had determined to grasp absolute power and destroy the 
constitution and the rights of the white people. When they were 
compelled to act in self defense, the monarchy disappeared.204 
 
Additional findings in favor for annexation included the assertion that dethronement had 
occurred peacefully prior to the landing of the Boston, and a moral necessity, described as 
“the release of [Hawai’i’s] people from the odious antirepublican regime which denies to 
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the people the right to govern themselves, and subordinates them to the supposed divine 
right of a monarch.”205  All in all, the Morgan Report fully embraced principles of 
colonialism and settler colonialism underlying the American presence in Hawai’i 
throughout the preceding century.  
In May of 1894, a resolution opposing restoration of the Queen, opposing 
intrusion into the affairs of the Provisional Government, and opposing American action 
that would immediately lead to annexation—a solution for everyone, except, as Tennant 
McWilliams has pointed out, for the independent people of Hawaii.206  The resolution 
passed the Senate unanimously, by a vote of 55-0.207  Finally, during the presidency of 
William McKinley in 1898, a joint resolution for annexation of Hawaii as a territory of the 
United States was approved by Congress. Hawai’i’s American statehood was passed in 
1954.  
Taken together, this sequence of events confirms that dispossession of land from 
Native peoples is inherent to America, irrespective of party, with little to do with party 
affiliation.208  
By dismissing Blount’s findings and deferring to Congress (and subsequent 
administrations), President Cleveland sealed the fate of Queen Lili’uokalani’s overthrow 
and establishment of the Provisional Government as an “unjust legality.”209 Ward Churchill 
explains that in America “‘law’ is presumed . . . always to prevail, despite the fact that law, 
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as such, may be conspicuous solely on the basis of its absence. Whenever America’s 
“government of laws” does or says something, whatever has been said or done must by 
virtue of its source be considered ‘legal’ . . . It is contended that the U.S., or more 
accurately, the state-corporate amalgam that has long since come to preside over it, is, in 
and of itself, ‘The Law.’”210 Cleveland used the Report to his advantage, expressing his 
moral umbrage over the unsavory actions of the few in Hawai’i, while still ultimately 
legitimating the power they exercised over Native Hawaiian people.  Though he openly 
characterized the overthrow as “unjust,” deciding that it would be “proper and expedient” 
to refer the decision to Congress, Cleveland sanctioned the overthrow as “legal.”  This 
perfectly illustrates Ward Churchill’s idea that ‘law’ functions as “a perfect instrument of 
subjugation.”211  
If settler colonization is, as Patrick Wolfe phrases it, “at base a winner-take-all 
project whose dominant feature is not exploitation but replacement,”212 then the 
annexationists in Hawai’i were betting on themselves when decided to overthrow the 
Queen.  And perhaps they were justified in doing so.213  In March 1893, President 
Cleveland wrote to the head of the Provisional Government informing him of Blount’s 
imminent arrival, and addressed him as “President Dole.”214  According to a biographer, 
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when Cleveland deferred to Congress on the matter, Dole lost no time in proclaiming the 
Republic of Hawai’i, which Cleveland also accepted. Sometime later, he greeted Dole as a 
“great and good friend” and offered best wishes for Dole’s “personal prosperity.”215 
V. Conclusion: The Significance of the Blount Report 
The timeline of pre-overthrow actions documented by Blount (from 1820-1893) 
demonstrates the American colonizers in Hawai’i transforming from (1) missionaries and 
foreigners, to (2) quasi-political Missionary Party, to (3) the Reform Party, and finally (3) 
the “Citizens’ Committee of Safety.”  This evolution of title reflects the evolution of a 
colonial framework to a settler colonial framework.  In the first two stages, the missionaries 
wanted to impose their superiority on a racially different group, and the foreigners came 
mostly for economic opportunity via exploitation of the land, while maintaining allegiance 
to their home countries and largely intended to return home. The Reform Party, comprised 
of missionary-descendants and foreigners with longer-term economic focuses, seized 
political power and sought to leverage that control to create circumstances better for 
themselves and worse for Natives in Hawai’i. Both of these operate on the underlying 
reinforcement of difference between colonizer and colonized—more power to the latter, 
and disenfranchisement of the former.  The missionaries and reformers manipulated the 
Crown to their advantage, but all the same, the monarchy was still recognized.   
Eventually, the formation of the Citizens’ Committee of Safety made clear the 
Reformers’ distinctly settler intentions: land the U.S. troops in Honolulu, dethrone the 
Queen, and annex to the United States. No longer did Americans seek to civilize, exploit, 
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and return to America—instead, to “settle permanently, and as part of that process, to 
exercise sovereignty over the territory[y] they occupied.”216 
Lorenzo Veracini suggests that “settler colonialism is the most recognizable when it 
is the most imperfect.”217 Today, America’s Hawai’i is a settler colonial state, and a 
relatively successful one, covering its tracks, for one, through the passage of Hawai’i’s 
official statehood in 1959.  Americans generally would not recognize Hawai’i as a colony, 
but as a legitimate part of the United States.  The Blount Report brings light to each step of 
colonization in Hawai’i—missionaries seeking to teach and civilize, the gradual 
implementation of American legal and property structures, and finally the Reform Party 
seeking to dethrone the Queen and annex to the United States.  The Report’s terms and 
consequences implicate the United States and its role in legitimating a clearly illegal and 
unjust seizure of power. For these, the Blount Report is an unfortunate error to an 
otherwise well-designed settler colonial structure.  
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